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"Reason can't stand in for feeling."2
"There exists a right by which we take a man's life but none by
which we take him from his death. . . .

I.

INTRODUCTION

In this country, every woman can terminate a pregnancy prior to the
stage of viability. Terminally-ill patients may hasten their own death
by refusing medical treatment. States intentionally murder those convicted of the most serious crimes, albeit inconsistently. In each of
these cases lays a common theme-the government decides when, and
under what circumstances, a life, or a potential life, may be ended.
There is one realm, however, the government may not regulate-the
relationship between the human being and itself. That relationship
bestows upon the individual the right to determine when, and under
what circumstances, his life may be ended.
Every individual in this country who has reached the age of majority should have the right to commit suicide, whether he suffers from
mental or physical illness or is in perfect health. The right to end
one's life, at a time and in a manner of one's choosing, is not only the
ultimate expression of freedom but is also a reflection of how much
we value and respect life itself. Of course, this statement would be
rejected by "right-to-life" proponents, whose arguments against issues
such as physician-assisted suicide and the right to terminate a pregnancy are predicated precisely upon their own conceptions of the inherent "value" of life.
However, while the above statement may sound counterintuitive to
right-to-life proponents, it seems this way only because there are specific, ingrained assumptions regarding the definition of "rights" and
2. ELvis PRESLEY, Ive Lost You, Ol THAT'S THE WAY IT IS (RCA 1970).
3. FRIEDRICH NIETZSCHE, HUMAN, ALL Too HUMAN 48 (R.J. Hollingdale

trans., Cambridge Univ. Press, 2d ed. 1996) (1886).
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the inherent "value" of life that remain unchallenged. Thus, in arguing that suicide is a right that should be unconditionally accorded to
every individual-except for those not competent to make such a decision, this Article posits that the concept of rights and the value of
life should be fundamentally redefined in a manner that emphasizes
individual autonomy over the collective good.
When the assumptions of the current framework are challenged and
a new approach to the concept of rights and the value of life is
presented, the concept of suicide not only becomes palatable, but also
becomes an act that represents and reinforces the most basic civil liberties of an individual in a free society. The Supreme Court has already recognized these liberties in its substantive due process
jurisprudence. These liberties form the basic foundation for a cognizable right to suicide and include the autonomy to make intimate and
personal decisions about one's body, one's quality of life, and when
and under what circumstances one may terminate one's life. The government should not-and does not-have any right to interfere with
such personal and private decisions.
Importantly, however, in order to reframe the conception of rights
and the value of life, it is critical to identify and refute the basic assumptions that underlie the contemporary approach to individual decisions regarding the body, bodily integrity, and the quality of life.
The first of these assumptions is predicated upon the notion of duration. Under this conception, life should be preserved and protected
until it reaches its natural end. The only exception exists where an
individual has drafted an advanced directive stating unambiguously
that he does not want to be kept alive through artificial means, i.e.,
feeding tubes, which ineluctably hasten the dying process. The second
assumption is based upon the concept of irrationality. The traditional
presumption is that there is something wrong with people who want to
commit suicide, namely, they suffer from a demonstrable medical illness such as major depressive or bi-polar disorder. This argument
contends that the act of suicide can never be-and never is-the product of rational thought or deliberative decision-making. The third assumption is the malum in se notion. This view holds that suicide is an
inherently bad act that should be proscribed by both the courts and
legislature. The fourth assumption is based upon a collective, rather
than individual, premise. Specifically, suicide is wrong because it
would send a message that taking life is an acceptable act and would
thus create a culture where those who would otherwise be deterred
from committing suicide would now feel they could do so without reprisal. This can also be characterized as the slippery slope argument.
The final, and most critical assumption underlying the current value of
life concept is predicated upon a limited definition of individual rights
and, concomitantly, an overbearing view of state's rights. Under this
view, a state may simply assert a general interest in protecting and
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preserving life itself as a means to prevent an individual from making
the decision to terminate life, even where there exists no harm to third
parties. Pro-life proponents would assert that these core assumptions
reflect an unwavering commitment to the value of each individual's
life and liberty.
These assumptions, however, do exactly the opposite. These assumptions curtail and delimit the most basic and fundamental rights
that lie at the core of our constitutional guarantees: life, liberty, and
privacy. There can be no greater expression of liberty than that which
involves an individual's most intimate and personal decision regarding
the function and integrity of the body. Guided by these core values,
the Supreme Court's substantive due process jurisprudence has held
that certain rights are "fundamental" to the individual in that the state
cannot interfere with them absent a "compelling interest." In fact, the
Court has specifically found that individuals have the right to make
decisions regarding the termination of both potential life and life itself. For example, the state may not, under any circumstances, prevent a woman from ending a pregnancy prior to viability.
Additionally, provided there is an advanced directive, the state cannot
prevent a terminally-ill patient from refusing life-sustaining measures,
i.e. a feeding tube. Underlying each of the Supreme Court's landmark
decisions is the notion that the state may not interfere with an individual's liberty interests. These interests include the ability to make intimate decisions regarding one's body and quality of life.
The unconditional right to suicide is, at the very least, encompassed
within the Court's paradigm. Implicit in the Court's opinions is a view
regarding the concept of rights, as well as the value of life, that undermines the assumptions of and differs substantially from that of the
traditional right-to-life proponents. First, the Court's decisions promote a notion of rights which permit the individual to claim ownership
over his body and make decisions with respect thereto-provided
such decisions are the product of consent and rational thought and do
not infringe on the rights of third parties. In addition, the Court's
holdings contemplate a value of life in a more individualized and subjective sense, that is, they make it more difficult for the state to interfere with decisions relating to a person's life, liberty, and privacy.
The fundamental right to suicide follows logically from these decisions.4 As the foregoing discussion has demonstrated, however, the
right to suicide should not simply be deemed a fundamental right.
Rather, it should be deemed an absolute right, which can be curtailed
only in the most limited circumstances, such as when an individual is
not of sound mind and body, subject to abuse or coercion, or other4. For the purpose of clarity, this Article does not discuss physician-assisted suicide. The Article is also not limited to the suicide of those who are terminally ill.
Instead, it asserts that every adult, even an individual who is perfectly healthy and
rational, has a right to end his life.
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wise not in a position to freely, knowingly, and unconditionally make
the choice to commit suicide.
Ultimately, this Article strives to advance discussion of values and
rights and thereby give greater freedom to the individual in decisions
relating to life and liberty. This Article argues that the value of life is
best expressed when the concept of value is given a subjective rather
than objective meaning. In other words, the individual himself should
determine the value of his life. A third party should not force upon
that individual a determination with no understanding of an individual's private end-of-life choices. Life has value not because of how
others define it, but rather because of how each individual defines it.
Thus, an individual's actions in response to that assessment will vary,
and those actions may include making the decision to end his life. The
individual has the right to make that choice. The individual has the
right to decide how to live his life, on his own terms, and in accordance with his own judgments and discretion. The Constitution protects this interest, but more importantly, the nature of human
existence protects this interest.
Part II discusses the Supreme Court's substantive due process jurisprudence and why it provides the legal basis for an unconditional right
to suicide. Part III provides the theoretical basis for the right to suicide. Part IV endorses the right to commit suicide and argues there
should be an organization that helps individuals safely and peacefully
end their lives. However, this right, based upon notions of privacy
and liberty, is not absolute. There must be procedures in place to ensure the individual is of sound mind and body. In other words, it is
imperative to confirm that those individuals truly desire to commit
suicide and are not merely acting irrationally, as one might in the case
of a temporary emotional or physical trauma.

II. SUICIDE-THE CONSTITUTIONAL AND LEGAL FOUNDATION
The Supreme Court's substantive due process jurisprudence provides the legal basis that justifies an unconditional right to suicide.
The Court's jurisprudence develops the concept of liberty and privacy
in a manner that protects the individual's right to make the most intimate decisions regarding his body. These holdings support the right
to suicide not only in a fundamental sense but in an absolute sense as
well.
A.

Substantive Due Process Jurisprudence
1. Meyer v. Nebraska

In Meyer v. Nebraska, Nebraska enacted a law prohibiting the
teaching of any subject in a language other than English.' The plain5. Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390, 397 (1923).
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tiff, a schoolteacher, taught the subject of reading in German and was
subsequently convicted under the statute.6 In reversing the conviction
pursuant to the Fourteenth Amendment, the Supreme Court held as
follows:
While this Court has not attempted to define with exactness the liberty thus guaranteed, the term has received much consideration and
some of the included things have been definitely stated. Without
doubt, it denotes not merely freedom from bodily restraint but also
the right of the individual to contract, to engage in any of the common occupations of life, to acquire useful knowledge, to marry, establish a home and bring up children, to worship God according to
the dictates of his own conscience, and generally to enjoy those
privileges long recognized at common law as essential to the orderly
pursuit of happiness by free men.
In what is arguably the beginning of its substantive due process jurisprudence, the Court explained that "[t]he established doctrine is
that this liberty may not be interfered with, under the guise of protecting the public interest, by legislative action which is arbitrary or without reasonable relation to some purpose within the competence of the
State to effect."'
2.

Pierce v. Society of Sisters

In Pierce v. Society of Sisters, the State of Oregon enacted a criminal statute that required every parent, guardian, or individual responsible for the care, custody, or control of a child to send him to a public
school within the district where the child resided.' Appellee was an
organization dedicated to providing children (including orphans) with
private secular and religious education, and thus did not comply with
the statute's provisions.' 0 In finding the statute unconstitutional, the
Court held it "interfere[d] with the liberty of parents and guardians to
direct the upbringing and education of children under their control.""
The Court explained that "rights guaranteed by the Constitution may
not be abridged by legislation which has no reasonable relation to
some purpose within the competency of the State."12 In fact, "[t]he
fundamental theory of liberty upon which all governments in this
Union repose excludes any general power of the State to standardize
6. Id.
7. Id. at 399; see also William R. Musgrove, Note, Substantive Due Process: A
History of Liberty in the Due Process Clause, 2 U. ST. THOMAS J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 125,
132 (2008) ("The notion of fundamental rights in relation to privacy began in the 1923
case of Meyer v. Nebraska.").
8. Meyer, 262 U.S. at 399-400.
9. Pierce v. Soc'y of the Sisters of the Holy Names of Jesus & Mary, 268 U.S. 510,
530 (1925).
10. Id. at 531-32.
11. Id. at 534-35.
12. Id. at 535.
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its children by forcing them to accept instruction from public teachers
only."" Put differently, "[t]he child is not the mere creature of the
State; those who nurture him and direct his destiny have the right,
coupled with the high duty, to recognize and prepare him for additional obligations."14
3.

Griswold v. Connecticut

In Griswold v. Connecticut-a significant decision in the Court's
substantive due process jurisprudence-the Court reviewed the constitutionality of a statute prohibiting the use of contraceptives by any
person, including married couples." In examining the "wide range of
questions that implicate the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment," 1 6 the Court found the statute constitutionally infirm.
In so doing, the Court recognized the existence of a personal right to
privacy encompassed within the Bill of Rights and the Fourteenth
Amendment." More specifically, the Court held that there exist fundamental rights accorded to every individual even though such rights
are not explicitly mentioned in the Constitution:
The association of people is not mentioned in the Constitution nor
in the Bill of Rights. The right to educate a child in a school of the
parents' choice-whether public or private or parochial-is also not
mentioned. Nor is the right to study any particular subject or any
foreign language. Yet the First Amendment has been construed to
include certain of those rights . . .. The right to freedom of speech

and press includes not only the right to utter or to print, but the
right to distribute, the right to receive, the right to read, and freedom of inquiry, freedom of thought, and freedom to teach . . . .
Without those peripheral rights the specific rights would be less
secure. 18
13. Id.
14. Id.; see also Skinner v. Oklahoma, 316 U.S. 535, 541 (1942) (holding that the
forced sterilization of males who were convicted of two or more felonies involving
"moral turpitude" was unconstitutional; in so holding, the Court stated "[m]arriage
and procreation are fundamental to the very existence and survival of the race ....
He is forever deprived of a basic liberty.").
15. Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 480 (1965).
16. Id. at 481.
17. Id. at 484-85; see also Lackland H. Bloom, Jr., The Legacy of Griswold, 16
OHIo N.U. L. REV. 511, 512-13 (1989) ("If Griswold is remembered for one thing, it
is surely for having effectively given birth to the concept of an independent constitutional right of privacy .

. .

. [The Court] relied on the right of privacy as an aspect of

the constitutional source for its abortion decisions from Roe onward.").
18. Griswold, 381 U.S. at 482-83 (citations omitted); see also Bloom, supra note
17, at 516 ("Justice Douglas then noted how the concept of privacy was implied in the
third, fourth, fifth and ninth amendments, quoting language from the famous old
fourth and fifth amendment case of Boyd v. United States and the much more recent
fourth amendment case of Mapp v. Ohio, which referred to 'the privacies of life,' and
'the right to privacy' respectively. Justice Douglas was thus able to establish that
some sort of 'right of privacy' had been recognized as a constitutional concept in a
variety of contexts."); Sherry Colb, The Qualitative Dimension of FourthAmendment
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In other words, "[t]he foregoing cases suggest that specific guarantees in the Bill of Rights have penumbras, formed by emanations from
those guarantees that help give them life and substance." 9 Part of
that substance relates to "zones of privacy,"20 and prohibiting the use
of contraceptives to individuals "concerns a relationship lying within
the zone of privacy created by several fundamental constitutional
guarantees."2 1 Thus, as the Griswold Court stated, "[w]e deal with a
right of privacy older than the Bill of Rights-older than our political
parties .

. .

. Marriage is a coming together for better or for worse,

hopefully enduring, and intimate to the degree of being sacred." 22 It
is, in the most fundamental way, "an association that promotes a way
of life . . . a harmony in living" and a relationship "for as noble a

purpose as any involved in our prior decisions."23
4.

Eisenstadt v. Baird

In Eisenstadt v. Baird, the State of Massachusetts enacted legislation prohibiting non-married couples from obtaining contraceptives
for the purpose of preventing pregnancy.2 4 In finding the Massachusetts statute unconstitutional, the Court discussed not only the notion
of a right to privacy but also a liberty interest that lies at the core of
the Constitutional framework:
If under Griswold the distribution of contraceptives to married persons cannot be prohibited, a ban on distribution to unmarried persons would be equally impermissible. It is true that in Griswold the
right of privacy in question inhered in the marital relationship. Yet

the marital couple is not an independent entity with a mind and
heart of its own, but an association of two individuals each with a
separate intellectual and emotional makeup. If the right of privacy

means anything, it is the right of the individual, married or single, to
be free from unwarrantedgovernmental intrusion into matters so fundamentally a ecting a person as the decision whether to bear or beget a child.2 r
Importantly, the Court rejected the intimation that morality was a
sufficient basis upon which to justify the legislation, stating, "[t]o say
that contraceptives are immoral as such, and are to be forbidden to
"Reasonableness," 98 COLUM. L.

REV.

1642 (1998) (discussing privacy in the Fourth

Amendment context).

19. Griswold, 381 U.S. at 484 (emphasis omitted).
20. Id.
21. Id. at 685.

22. Id. at 486 (emphasis omitted).
23. Id.
24. Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438, 440-41 (1972).
25. Id. at 453; see also Daniel 0. Conkle, Three Theories of Substantive Due Pro-

cess, 85 N.C. L. REV. 63, 76 (2006) (discussing the evolution of substantive due process and stating how "the contemporary Supreme Court has shifted its terminology
from the 'right of privacy' to 'liberty' . . . .").
26. Eisenstadt, 405 U.S. at 453 (emphasis added).
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. . .

means that such persons must risk for them-

selves an unwanted pregnancy.. ."2 Indeed, "[s]uch a view of morality is not only the very mirror image of sensible legislation; we
consider that it conflicts with fundamental human rights." 28 Thus,
"[i]n the absence of demonstrated harm, we hold that it is beyond the
competency of the state."2 9
5.

Roe v. Wade

The Court's decision of Roe v. Wade was groundbreaking simply
because it held that a woman could terminate a pregnancy during the
first trimester without state interference."o What made Roe even
more remarkable was that, under its substantive due process jurisprudence, the Court found within the right of privacy the concomitant
right to make a decision with respect to the termination of life, or at
the very least, potential life.
In Roe, the petitioners challenged a Texas statute that criminalized
all abortions, except those required to save the life of the mother.3 2 In
finding the statute unconstitutional, the Court "recognized that a right
of personal privacy, or a guarantee of certain areas or zones of privacy, does exist under the Constitution." The Court also explained
that the right to privacy was based upon, inter alia, "the concept of
liberty guaranteed by the first section of the Fourteenth Amendment."3 4 In so holding, the Court clarified its concept of "rights," stating "only personal rights that can be deemed 'fundamental' or
'implicit in the concept of ordered liberty' are included in this guarantee of personal privacy."3 5 When a right is deemed "fundamental,"
"limiting [it] may be justified only by a 'compelling state interest.'" 3 6
27. Id. at 452 (citing Baird v. Eisenstadt, 429 F.2d 1398, 1402 (1st Cir. 1970)).
28. Id. at 453 (citing Baird, 429 F.2d at 1402).
29. Id. (emphasis added); see also Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1, 12 (1967) ("Marriage is one of the basic civil rights of man, fundamental to our very existence and
survival .

. .

. To deny this fundamental freedom on so unsupportable a basis as the

racial classifications embodied in these statutes, classifications so directly subversive
of the principles of equality at the heart of the Fourteenth Amendment, is surely to
deprive all the State's citizens of liberty without due process of law .

. .

. Under our

Constitution, the freedom to marry, or not marry, a person of another race resides
with the individual and cannot be infringed by the State."); Moore v. City of E. Cleveland, 431 U.S. 494, 503 (1977) ("[T]he Constitution protects the sanctity of the family
precisely because the institution is deeply rooted in this Nation's history and
tradition.").
30. Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 163-64 (1973).
31. See id. at 154.
32. Id. at 117-18.
33. Id. at 152.
34. Id. (citing Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390, 399 (1923)).
35. Id. (citations omitted).
36. Id. at 155 (quoting Kramer v. Union Free School Dist., 395 U.S. 621, 627
(1969)).
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Based upon these principles, the Court held "[tihe right of privacy
... is broad enough to encompass a woman's decision whether or not

to terminate her pregnancy."" Importantly, however, while "the right
of personal privacy includes the abortion decision," it is not "unqualified and must be considered against important state interests in regulation."" Specifically, "at some point the state interests as to
protection of health, medical standards, and prenatal life, become
dominant [and compelling]."" In determining when the mother's fundamental right to privacy is outweighed by a State's "important and
legitimate interest in the health of the mother," the Court found that
the "'compelling' point is at viability," which is generally thought to
occur at "approximately the end of the first trimester. "40
The Court's justification for permitting state interference at this
juncture was also predicated upon concerns for the preservation of
life, namely, those of the mother and fetus.4 1 Specifically, because
mortality rates after the first trimester were the same during the remaining parts of the pregnancy, the "State may regulate the abortion
procedure to the extent that the regulation reasonably relates to the
preservation and protection of maternal health." 42 For example, the
state may enact regulations concerning "the qualifications of the person who is to perform the abortion . .. the licensure of that person ...

whether it must be in a hospital or may be a clinic . . . and the like." 43
In other words, "[t]he privacy right involved ... cannot be said to be

absolute. "44

37. Id. at 153; see also Bruce C. Hafen, The ConstitutionalStatus of Marriage,Kinship, and Sexual Privacy-Balancingthe Individual and Societal Interests, 81 MICH. L.
REV. 463, 520 (1983) ("Roe v. Wade, for example, located the privacy right within the
meaning of due process 'liberty,' . . . . [However,] the Roe majority directly repudi-

ated an 'unlimited right' of privacy that would allow one 'to do with one's body as one
pleases.'") (quoting Roe, 410 U.S. at 154).
38. Roe, 410 U.S. at 154.
39. Id. at 155.
40. Id. at 163.
41. Id. at 163-64.
42. Id. at 163.
43. Id.
44. Id. at 154. More specifically, the Court held as follows:
The pregnant woman cannot be isolated in her privacy. She carries an embryo and, later, a fetus, if one accepts the medical definitions of the developing young in the human uterus.

. .

. The situation therefore is inherently

different from marital intimacy, or bedroom possession of obscene material,
or marriage, or procreation, or education, with which Eisenstadt and Griswold, Stanley, Loving, Skinner, and Pierce and Meyer were respectively concerned . .. it is reasonable and appropriate for a State to decide that at some
point in time another interest, that of health of the mother or that of potential human life, becomes significantly involved. The woman's privacy is no
longer sole and any right of privacy she possesses must be measured
accordingly.
Id. at 159.
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Additionally, the Court's holding also recognized the "State's important and legitimate interest in potential life," which exists at the
point of "viability."45 The Court's reasoning was predicated upon the
notion that "the fetus then presumably has the capability of meaningful life outside the mother's womb ... [and] State regulation protec-

tive of fetal life after viability thus has both logical and biological
justification."4 6 Accordingly, after the fetus is viable, the state "may
go so far as to proscribe abortion . . . except when it is necessary to

preserve the life or health of the mother." 47
Therefore, Roe is a critical decision because it involves the Court's
application of the fundamental right to privacy to decisions involving
both the termination (abortion) and the commencement (viability) of
life. Importantly, the Court did not explain how the right to terminate
a potential life could properly be deduced under the privacy rubric. It
did, however, provide some guidance concerning the circumstances
under which a state may intervene to prevent a person from making
an end-of-life decision regarding another viable life. The critical question, however, is whether these justifications can be applied to override the fundamental right to privacy and prevent the individual from
making the decision to commit suicide. The reasons set forth later in
this Article demonstrate that they cannot.
6.

Bowers v. Hardwick

In Bowers v. Hardwick, the petitioner challenged the constitutionality of a statute that criminalized both homosexual and heterosexual
sodomy.4 8 In finding the statute constitutional, the Court framed the
substantive due process inquiry somewhat differently than it had in its
prior jurisprudence; namely, by inquiring "whether the Federal Constitution confers a fundamental right upon homosexuals to engage in
sodomy and hence invalidates the laws of the many States that still
make such conduct illegal and have done so for a very long time."4
In answering this question in the negative, the Court found that the
right of privacy in the Fourteenth Amendment does not extend to homosexual sodomy.s0 As the Court explained, although the privacy interest of the Fourteenth Amendment created the right to childrearing, education, procreation, marriage, contraception, and abortion, "none of the rights announced in those cases bears any resemblance to the claimed constitutional right of homosexuals to engage in
acts of sodomy... ."" Furthermore, "[njo connection between family,
45.
46.
47.
48.
49.
50.
51.

Id. at 163.
Id.
Id. at 163-64.
Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186, 186 (1986).
Id. at 190.
Id. at 190-91.
Id.
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marriage or procreation on the one hand and homosexuality on the
other has been demonstrated .... "52 With respect to the Fourteenth
Amendment's privacy interest, the Court also held that "any claim
that these cases [i.e., Griswold, Roe, Loving, Meyer, and Pierce, inter
alia] ... stand for the proposition that any kind of private sexual con-

duct between consenting adults is constitutionally insulated from state
proscription is unsupportable."5 3
The Court's reasoning also attacked the basic premises upon which
its substantive due process jurisprudence was predicated. Specifically,
the Court recognized that the "fundamental liberties" acknowledged
in cases such as Griswold were based on freedoms "'implicit in the
concept of ordered liberty' such that 'neither liberty nor justice would
exist if [they] were sacrificed."' 54 The Court held a right to homosexual sodomy could not survive under either principle. In fact, as the
Court clarified, at least one case defined the concept of fundamental
rights as those "'deeply rooted in this Nation's history and tradition.'"" Under this formulation, there could be no recognition of a
right to homosexual sodomy because "[p]roscriptions against that conduct have ancient roots."5 6 Specifically, "[s]odomy was a criminal offense at common law and was forbidden by the laws of the original
thirteen States when they ratified the Bill of Rights.""
Thus, Bowers was an important decision because it highlighted the
three lines of analysis by which the Court could recognize new rights
under the Fourteenth Amendment's Due Process Clause. What was
52. Id. at 191.
53. Id.
54. Id. at 191-92 (quoting Palko v. Connecticut, 302 U.S. 319, 325 (1937)).
55. Id. at 192 (quoting Moore v. City of E. Cleveland, 431 U.S. 494, 503 (1977)).
56. Id.
57. Id. at 192.
58. See Brett J. Williamson, The ConstitutionalPrivacy Doctrine After Bowers v.
Hardwick: Rethinking the Second Death of Substantive Due Process, 62 S. CAL. L.
REv. 1297, 1312 (1989) (stating that the majority's opinion in Bowers was based on
three principles). Williamson's analysis was as follows:
First, the Court held that the Griswold line of cases extended the privacy
protection only to matters concerning the family, marriage, or procreationcategories into which homosexual sodomy clearly does not fit. Second, the
... identification of a right as "fundamental" and thus worthy of protection
under the due process clause depended on whether it met the tests implied
by the well-worn quotes "implicit in the concept of ordered liberty" and
"deeply rooted in this Nation's history and tradition." . . . Third, the majority
expressed a general disapproval of expanding the universe of Court created
rights, holding that "there should be . . . great resistance to expand the substantive reach of the due process clause, particularly if it requires redefining
the category of rights deemed to be fundamental."
Id. See also Daniel 0. Conkle, The Second Death of Substantive Due Process,62 IND.
L.J. 215 (1987) (stating that substantive due process might be headed to a second
death); Michael J. Phillips, The Nonprivacy Applications of Substantive Due Process,
21 RUTGERS L.J. 537, 537 (1990) ("The Supreme Court's . . . decision in Bowers v.
Hardwick sparked some commentators to speculate whether the doctrine of substantive due process was once again headed for obscurity.").
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perhaps more interesting, however, was how the Court framed the inquiry, namely, whether homosexuals had the right to engage in sodomy. If, for example, the Court had framed the issue as whether
consenting adults have the right to engage in private sexual conduct
free from state regulation, the result might have been different. These
formulations, therefore, directly impact the Court's decisions and the
nature of how we conceive "rights" under the Constitution.
7.

Cruzan v. Director,Missouri Department of Health

In Cruzan v. Director,Missouri Department of Health, the petition-

ers, the parents of co-petitioner Nancy Cruzan who sustained severe
injuries in an automobile accident and was in a persistent vegetative
state, sought to terminate her artificial nutrition and hydration, thus
hastening her death." The state of Missouri opposed this request because, pursuant to a state statute governing the withdrawal of medical
treatment, there was not clear and convincing evidence from Cruzan
herself that she would wish to discontinue such treatment if ever in a
vegetative state. 6 0 The only evidence that did exist stemmed from a
conversation with a friend in which Cruzan indicated that she would
not wish to "continue her life" if in a vegetative state. 6 1 As a result,
this matter presented the difficult issue of when a person's desire to
refuse medical treatment (and thus hasten death) can outweigh the
state's interest in preserving life.
The Court began its analysis by recognizing that "a competent person has a constitutionally protected liberty interest in refusing unwanted medical treatment," which could be "inferred from [the
Court's] prior decisions."6 2 In fact, "[i]t cannot be disputed that the
Due Process Clause protects an interest . . . in refusing life-sustaining

medical treatment."6 3 For example, a person has a right to refuse
medication, such as anti-psychotic drugs, because "[t]he forcible injection of medication into a nonconsenting person's body represents a
substantial interference with that person's liberty." 6 4 However, the
determination that a person "has a 'liberty interest' under the Due
Process Clause does not end the inquiry; 'whether respondent's constitutional rights have been violated must be determined by balancing
his liberty interests against the relevant state interest.'" 6 5
In this case, the Court found in favor of Missouri but on grounds
that neither abridged nor infringed upon the fundamental right to re59.
60.
61.
62.
ancing
State's
63.
64.
65.

Cruzan v. Dir., Mo. Dep't of Health, 497 U.S. 261, 265 (1990).
Id. at 268-69.
Id. at 268.
Id. at 278; see also Jacobson v. Massachusetts, 197 U.S. 11, 25-27 (1905) (balan individual's liberty interest in refusing a small pox vaccination against the
interest in preventing disease).
Cruzan, 497 U.S. at 281.
Id. at 278 (quoting Washington v. Harper, 494 U.S. 210, 229 (1990)).
Id. at 279 (quoting Youngsberg v. Romeo, 457 U.S. 307, 321 (1982)).
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fuse medical treatment and thereby hasten death. The Court held that
the "United States Constitution would grant a competent person a
constitutionally protected right to refuse lifesaving hydration and nutrition."66 However, because Cruzan was in a vegetative state, she
was unable to "make an informed and voluntary choice to exercise her
constitutional right to refuse medical treatment." 6 7 Consequently,
"[s]uch a 'right' must be exercised for her, if at all, by some sort of
surrogate," which in this case was her parents.6 8
Given the fundamental right at stake and Cruzan's inability to express her own wishes, the Court held that Missouri's statute was constitutionally permissible. 6 9 The Court found Missouri had an
important interest in "the protection and preservation of human life"
and was not required "to remain neutral in the face of an informed
and voluntary decision by a physically able adult to starve to death."o
Indeed, because "[t]he choice between life and death is a deeply personal decision of obvious and overwhelming finality," a state "may
legitimately seek to safeguard the personal element of this choice
through the imposition of heightened evidentiary requirements."
Additionally, "a [s]tate may properly decline to make judgments
about the quality of life a particular individual may enjoy and simply
assert an unqualified interest in the preservation of human life to be
weighed against the constitutionally protected interests of the individual."72 This interest had particular force here because Cruzan was unable to express her own wishes regarding the desire to terminate
medical treatment; she had to rely upon surrogates, who would not
necessarily act in the patient's best interest. As the Court noted,
"'[t]here will, of course, be some unfortunate situations in which family members will not act to protect the patient.'" 74 Accordingly, the
66. Id. (emphasis added).
67. Id. at 280.
68. Id. In finding Missouri's statute constitutional, the Court held as follows:
An incompetent person is not able to make an informed and voluntary
choice to exercise a hypothetical right to refuse treatment or any other right
.... Here, Missouri has in effect recognized that under certain circumstances
a surrogate may act for the patient in electing to have hydration and nutrition withdrawn in such a way as to cause death, but it has established a
procedural safeguard to assure that the action of the surrogate conforms as
best it may to the wishes expressed by the patient while competent. Missouri requires that evidence of the incompetent's wishes as to the withdrawal
of treatment be proved by clear and convincing evidence. The question,
then, is whether the United States Constitution forbids the establishment of
this procedural requirement by the State. We hold that it does not.
Id.
69.
70.
71.
72.
73.
74.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 282.
Id. at 281.
Id. (quoting In re Jobes, 529 A.2d 434, 447 (N.J. 1987)).
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States "[are] entitled to guard against potential abuses in such
situations.""
Ultimately, the Court held "Missouri has permissibly sought to advance these interests through the adoption of a 'clear and convincing
evidence' standard of proof" when surrogates are seeking to exercise
a patient's right to refuse unwanted, life-saving medical treatment.7 6
Thus, because Cruzan's expressed wishes regarding the refusal of
medical treatment did not meet this standard, her parents could not
legally withdraw the life-saving treatment she was receiving.
8.

Planned Parenthood v. Casey

In PlannedParenthoodv. Casey, 8 the Court applied the Fourteenth
Amendment's liberty and privacy interests to a case involving, at the
very least, potential life. Here, the petitioners challenged several provisions of a statute that placed various limitations and regulations on
the ability to obtain an abortion.7 1 Specifically, the statute (1) required a woman to give informed consent prior to the procedure; (2)
mandated the informed consent of a parent in the event that a minor
was seeking an abortion (although there was a judicial bypass procedure); (3) required a married woman seeking an abortion to obtain
the consent of her husband; (4) provided a "medical emergency" exception that exempted a woman from any of the foregoing requirements; and (5) imposed "certain reporting requirements on facilities
providing abortion services."8o The Court's decision was a pivotal
moment in substantive due process jurisprudence because the statute
tested just how far a state could interfere with a woman's right to terminate a pregnancy prior to viability.
The Court ultimately upheld the core holding of Roe, as well as the
privacy and liberty interests that underscored its decision.s" The
Court first recognized "the right of the woman to choose to have an
abortion before viability and to obtain it without undue interference
from the State." 82 The Court further explained that "protection of the
woman's decision to terminate her pregnancy derives from the Due
Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment . . . [and] the controlling word . . . is liberty."" The concept of "liberty" means, at its very

core, "a promise of the Constitution that there is a realm of personal
liberty which the government may not enter," and the "substantive
liberties protected by the Fourteenth Amendment" are not limited to
75.
76.
77.
78.
79.
80.
81.
82.
83.

Id.
Id. at 282.
Id. at 285-86.
See Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833 (1992).
Id. at 844.
Id.
Id. at 846-47.
Id. at 846.
Id.
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"those recognized by the Bill of Rights" or those that "were protected
against governmental interference . . . when the Fourteenth Amend-

ment was ratified."8 4 In other words, the liberty and privacy interests
guaranteed by the Fourteenth Amendment are not limited to "those
rights already guaranteed to the individual against federal interference" or to the "precise terms of the specific guarantees elsewhere
provided in the Constitution.""
Instead, the Fourteenth Amendment protects the notions of liberty
and privacy in a much broader sense that encompasses rights not explicitly referenced in the Constitution. For example, "[m]arriage is
mentioned nowhere in the Bill of Rights and interracial marriage was
illegal in most States in the 19th century, but the Court was no doubt
correct in finding it to be an aspect of liberty protected against state
interference by the substantive component of the Due Process
Clause.""6 In other words, the liberty protected by the Due Process
Clause "is not a series of isolated points pricked out in terms of the
taking of property; the freedom of speech, press, and religion . . . "
rather, it is a "rational continuum which, broadly speaking, includes
freedom from all substantial arbitrary impositions and purposeless restraints."" Ultimately, due process "has not been reduced to any
formula,"" it instead reflects the "traditions from which it developed
as well as the traditions from which it broke," 9 and that tradition "is a
living thing." 90
It was precisely upon this basis that the core ruling of Roe was upheld. Crucially, however, the reasoning in Roe had implications far
beyond its holding. The holding implicitly recognized the nature of
independence that the Constitution provides to each individual. In
discussing basic fundamental rights such as marriage and procreation,
the Court stated, "[t]hese matters, involving the most intimate and
personal choices a person may make in a lifetime, choices central to
personal dignity and autonomy, are central to the liberty protected by
the Fourteenth Amendment."9 1 As the Court stated, "[a]t the heart of
liberty is the right to define one's own concept of existence, of meaning, of the universe, and of the mystery of human life." 92 Indeed,
"[b]eliefs about these matters could not define the attributes of personhood were they formed under the compulsion of the State." 9 3
84. Id. at 847 (citing Poe v. Ullman, 367 U.S. 497, 543 (1961) (Harlan, J.,
dissenting)).
85. Id. at 847-48 (quoting Poe, 367 U.S. at 543 (Harlan, J., dissenting)).
86. Id.
87. Id. at 848 (quoting Poe, 367 U.S. at 543).
88. Id. at 840.
89. Id. at 850.
90. Id.
91. Id. at 851.
92. Id.
93. Id.
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Thus, when reaffirming a woman's right to terminate a pregnancya decision that originates "within the zone of conscience and belief"the Court was guided by these principles.9 4 In addressing this complex issue, the Court recognized that abortion is "a unique act" and
that "some deem [it] nothing short of an act of violence against innocent human life."9 5 Significantly, however, it did "not follow that the
State is entitled to proscribe it in all instances . . . because . .. the

liberty of the woman is at stake in a sense unique to the human condition and so unique to the law." 9 6 As the Court held:
The mother who carries a child to full term is subject to anxieties, to
physical constraints, to pain that only she must bear. That these sacrifices have from the beginning of the human race been endured by
a woman with a pride that ennobles her in the eyes of others and
gives to the infant a bond of love cannot alone be grounds for the
State to insist she make the sacrifice. Her suffering is too intimate
and personal for the State to insist, without more, upon its own vision of the woman's role, however dominant that vision has been in
the course of our history and our culture. The destiny of the woman
conception of her spirimust be shaped to a large extent on her own
tual imperatives and her place in society. 97
Accordingly, "it was this dimension of personal liberty that Roe
sought to protect, and its holding invoked the reasoning and the tradition of the precedents [the Court has] discussed, granting protection
to substantive liberties of the person."98 The Court reaffirmed Roe,
invalidated certain parts of the Pennsylvania statute, and held that the
state may not place an "undue burden" 9 9 upon a woman's right to
terminate a pregnancy prior to viability."oo The Court's holding recognized "that the urgent claims of the woman to retain the ultimate control over her destiny and her body" are claims "implicit in the
meaning of liberty."'
94. Id. at 851-52.
95. Id. at 852.
96. Id.
97. Id.
98. Id. at 853.
99. Id. at 876; see also Mary Helen Wimberly, Note, Rethinking the Substantive
Due Process Right to Privacy: Grounding Privacy in the Fourth Amendment, 60
VAND. L. REV. 283, 304 (2007):
Under the undue burden standard, Casey authorized a regulation requiring
informed consent [prior to an abortion], overruling previous decisions to the
contrary. Casey also permitted a mandatory twenty-four hour waiting period, even though this also had previously been held unconstitutional. However, the Court struck down a regulation requiring spousal notification as
unduly burdensome. The only distinction between these regulations appears
to be the Court's subjective determination of what constitutes an undue
burden.
Id.
100. Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 869-70 (1992).
101. Id. at 869.
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Washington v. Glucksberg

In Washington v. Glucksberg, the Court confronted the issue of

whether the "liberty" interest under the Due Process Clause protects
the right of assisted suicide for terminally-ill patients. The State of
Washington enacted a statute providing that "[a] person is guilty of
promoting a suicide attempt when he knowingly causes or aids another person to attempt suicide." 102 The statute also provided that the
"withholding or withdrawal of life-sustaining treatment . . . shall not,

for any purpose, constitute a 'suicide' and that '[n]othing in this chapter shall be construed to condone, authorize or approve mercy
killing.' "103

In upholding the statute, the Court held the Fourteenth Amendment does not include a fundamental right to assisted suicide.10 4 The
Court focused upon the notion that the Due Process Clause "specially
protects those fundamental rights and liberties which are, objectively,
'deeply rooted in this Nation's history and tradition . . . ."10 Using
this standard, the Court explained that "[i]n almost every State-indeed, in almost every western democracy-it is a crime to assist a suicide . . . and assisted suicide bans are . . . longstanding expressions of

the States' commitment to the protection and preservation of all
human life."10 6 In fact, "opposition to and condemnation of suicideand, therefore, of assisting suicide-are consistent and enduring
themes of our philosophical, legal and cultural heritages."107 Furthermore, "for over 700 years, the Anglo-American common-law tradition
has punished or otherwise disapproved of both suicide and assisting
Stated simply, "[t]he history of the law's treatment of assuicide."'
sisted suicide in this country has been and continues to be one of the
rejection of nearly all efforts to permit it."' 0 9 Accordingly, in part due
to the "consistent and almost universal tradition""s0 against permitting
assisted suicide, the Court concluded that assisted suicide was "not a
fundamental liberty interest protected by the Due Process Clause.""'
Finally, the Glucksberg Court held that a state's interest in prohibiting assisted suicide outweighed a terminally-ill patient's right to
hasten death. Specifically, the Court held "[t]hose who attempt suicide-terminally ill or not-often suffer from depression or other
102. Washington v. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702, 707 (1997) (quoting WASH. REV.
§ 9A.36.060(1) (1994)).
103. Id. at 717 (quoting WASH. REV. CODE H§ 70.122.070(1), 70.122.100 (1994)).
104. Id. at 751.
105. Id. at 720-21 (quoting Snyder v. Massachusetts, 291 U.S. 97, 105 (1934)).
106. Id. at 710.
107. Id. at 711.
108. Id.
109. Id. at 728.
110. Id. at 723.
111. Id. at 728.

CODE
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mental disorders."' 12 In addition, the Court found Washington's interest in protecting "vulnerable groups"113 legitimate (including the
poor, the elderly, and disabled persons) from "subtle coercion and undue influence in end-of-life situations."1 14 Critically, however, five
justices who wrote concurring opinions in Glucksberg suggested that,
at a certain point in the future, an assisted suicide statute may be declared unconstitutional.1 1 5
10.

Lawrence v. Texas

In Lawrence v. Texas, the Court was again faced with the constitutionality of a Texas statute criminalizing homosexual sodomy between
consenting adults.'1 6 Extraordinarily, in Lawrence, the Court not only
invalidated the statute and overturned Bowers, but it also fundamentally reframed the substantive due process analysis. 1
First, the Court held the Bowers majority erred when it formulated
the due process inquiry as to whether the Constitution "'confers a
fundamental right upon homosexuals to engage in sodomy and hence
invalidates the laws of the many states that still make such conduct
illegal and have done so for a very long time.""'18 This formulation,
the Court noted, failed "to appreciate the extent of the liberty at
stake."" 9 Specifically, "[t]he laws involved in Bowers and here are . ..
statutes that purport to do no more than prohibit a particular sexual
act," but their "penalties and purposes . . . have more far-reaching

consequences, touching upon the most private human conduct, sexual
behavior, in the most private of places, the home."1 2 0 In other words,
"the statutes . . . seek to control a personal relationship that, whether

or not entitled to formal recognition in the law, is within the liberty of
112. Id. at 730.
113. Id. at 731.
114. Id. at 732.
115. See Jerry H. Elmer, Physician-Assisted Suicide Controversy at the Intersection
of Law and Medicine, 46 R.I. BAR J. 13, 34 (1998). Elmer states as follows:
Of far greater interest than Justice Rehnquist's remarkably shallow opinion
for the Court in Glucksberg, is the fact that five justices (O'Connor, Stevens,
Souter, Ginsburg and Breyer)-that is, a majority of the Court-wrote concurring opinions expressly leaving open the possibility that assisted-suicide
statutes might be declared unconstitutional in the future on substantive due
process grounds. Justice O'Connor, in her very brief concurrence, put the
matter most succinctly. This case, she said, presented only a facial challenge
to the Washington statute; as such, she felt constrained to uphold the facial
constitutionality of the statute. Thus, Justice O'Connor said, she "sees no
need to reach" the issue as to whether or not an individual has a "constitutionally cognizable interest in controlling the circumstances of his or her imminent death."
Id. (citing Glucksberg, 521 U.S. at 736 (Ginsburg, J., concurring)).
116. Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 563 (2003).
117. See id. at 577-78.
118. Id. at 566-67 (quoting Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186, 190 (1986)).
119. Id. at 567.
120. Id.
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persons to choose without being punished as criminals."' 2 1 The Court
found this aspect of the statutes impermissible:
It suffices for us to acknowledge that adults may choose to enter
upon this relationship in the confines of their homes and their own
private lives and still retain their dignity as free persons. When sexuality finds overt expression in intimate conduct with another person,
the conduct can be but one element in a personal bond that is more
enduring. The liberty protected by the Constitution allows homosexuals the right to make this choice.12 2
Thus, the Court's reasoning "should counsel against attempts by the
State, or a court, to define the meaning of the relationship or to set its
boundaries absent injury to a person or abuse of an institution that

law protects."1 2 3
The Court's holding also reshaped the due process inquiry for determining whether newly asserted rights are entitled to constitutional
protection. Specifically, while the Court examined the Nation's "history and tradition" 124 with respect to homosexual conduct, the Court
stated that "'history and tradition are the starting point, but not in 1 all
25
cases the ending point of the substantive due process inquiry.'"
Thus, while disagreeing with Bowers and finding, as a historical matter, that "there is no longstanding history in this country of laws directed at homosexual conduct as a distinct matter,"' 2 6 the Court held
that "our laws and traditions in the past half century are of most relevance here."1 27 Using this new framework, the Court held "[t]hese
references show an emerging awareness that liberty gives substantial
protection to adult persons in deciding how to conduct their private
lives in matters pertaining to sex."' 2 8
The Court relied upon the language in Planned Parenthoodv. Casey
to support its holding, reiterating that matters "central to personal
dignity and autonomy, are central to the liberty protected by the Fourteenth Amendment."1 29 Furthermore, "[a]t the heart of liberty is the
right to define one's own concept of existence, of meaning, of the universe, and of the mystery of human life.""o The Court also relied
upon case law from the European Court of Human Rights 131 namely
Dudgeon v. United Kingdom, which held that laws proscribing homo121. Id.
122. Id.
123. Id.
124. Id. at 572.
125. Id. (quoting Cnty. of Sacramento v. Lewis, 523 U.S. 833, 857 (1998) (Kennedy,
J., concurring)).
126. Id. at 568.
127. Id. at 571-72.
128. Id. at 572.
129. Id. at 574 (quoting Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 851 (1992)).
130. Id. (quoting Casey, 505 U.S. at 851).
131. Id. at 576.
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sexual conduct were invalid under the European Convention on
Human Rights.1 32
It was precisely this type of private, consensual, and autonomous
conduct that the Court found lay outside the purview of state regulation. As the Court explained, "[t]he present case does not involve
minors," . . . "persons who might be injured or coerced," or individu-

als "who are situated in relationships where consent might not easily
be refused." 13 3 It also "does not involve whether the government
must give formal recognition to any relationship that homosexual persons seek to enter."13 4 Rather, it involves "two adults who, with full
and mutual consent from each other, engaged in sexual practices common to a homosexual lifestyle."'
Stated simply, "the petitioners are
entitled to respect for their private lives," and the State cannot "demean their existence or control their destiny" by criminalizing their
private sexual conduct.' 3 6 The liberty interest entitles them to "engage in their conduct without intervention of the government." 37
That interest reflects the settled principle that "there is a realm of
personal liberty which the government may not enter." 38
The Court's holding, however, went further. It indicated new "fundamental rights" reflecting greater and more contemporary notions of
freedom would-and should-be part of the Court's jurisprudence.
As the majority stated, "[h]ad those who drew and ratified the Due
Process Clauses of the Fifth Amendment or the Fourteenth Amendment known the components of liberty in its manifold possibilities,
they might have been more specific." 39 However, "[t]hey did not
presume to have this insight"1 40 and were aware that "times can blind
us to certain truths and later generations can see that laws once
thought necessary and proper in fact serve only to oppress."141 "As
the Constitution endures, persons in every generation can invoke its
principles in their own search for greater freedom." 14 2
B.

The Right to Suicide-The Legal Basis

The Supreme Court's Fourteenth Amendment jurisprudence constructs an initial framework for analyzing an unconditional right to
suicide because it provides guidance concerning not only what the
Constitution prohibits and permits, but also what it represents. Spe132.
133.
134.
135.
136.
137.
138.
139.
140.
141.
142.

Dudgeon v. United Kingdom, 45 Eur. Ct. H.R.
61, 63 (1981).
Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 578.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. (quoting Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 847 (1992)).
Id.
Id. at 578-79.
Id. at 579.
Id.
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cifically, in cases such as Griswold, Roe, Casey, and Lawrence, the

Court's decisions are based upon several recurrent themes that provide the substantive basis for recognizing individual (and fundamental) rights in a free society.
The first theme is autonomy. The Court's cases recognize that the
"individual" is a fundamentally free entity. Implicit in these decisions
is the notion that individual freedom is a subjective enterprise which
vests in each person the right to control, direct, and decide how their
life will be lived. In other words, freedom allows the individual to act
according to his values and beliefs while remaining largely free from
external interference. The Court's decisions recognize this intrinsic
concept of freedom by identifying "liberty" and "privacy" interests
that lie at the core of the Due Process Clause, which cannot be
abridged by the state absent compelling interests.
The second theme is the individual's right to make decisions regarding his body, bodily integrity, quality of life, and destiny. For example,
in Roe, the Court emphasized that a woman can terminate a pregnancy before viability because she has the right to make fundamental
choices regarding her body and spiritual beliefs.14 3 The woman's liberty interests outweigh the state's interest in protecting pre-natal life,
even though most agree the fetus is a potential person before viability.144 In Cruzan, the Court expressly recognized that a terminally-ill
patient has the right to refuse unwanted end-of-life treatment and, in
doing so, hasten his death.145
In Casey, the Court reaffirmed Roe and relied upon principles central to freedom, such as personal dignity, autonomy, and the "right to
define one's own concept of existence, of meaning, of the universe,
and of the mystery of human life."14 6 Of course, while the Glucksberg
Court declined to recognize a right to assisted suicide, it did so primarily because this right was not historically accorded legal or statutory
protection. 14 7 Importantly, however, Lawrence modified this approach in holding that history and tradition do not end the fundamental rights inquiry.148 Rather, contemporary notions of freedom,
liberty, and privacy are most relevant to inform this constitutional

discourse. 149

143. Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 155, 160-61 (1973) (explaining that the right to
privacy extends to abortion, and discussing that various faiths believe that life begins
at conception).
144. Id. at 162-64 (discussing the competing interests of the woman and her physician versus those of the State).
145. Cruzan v. Dir., Mo. Dep't of Health, 497 U.S. 261, 278 (1990).
146. Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 851 (1992).
147. Washington v. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702, 711, 728 (1997).
148. Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 572 (2003).
149. See id. at 578-79.
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The third theme is privacy. In holding "there is a realm of personal
liberty which the government may not enter,""'o the Court is saying
the individual's body and decisions made with respect thereto
(whether it is the termination of a pregnancy or refusal of medical
treatment) are entitled to be made by the individual in conjunction
with his conscience and subjective view regarding the quality of life.
The right to make these decisions in private, therefore, is a logical
expression of freedom because it ensures the individual can make decisions without undue interference or influence from the state.
The fourth theme is consent. The Court's cases have intimated that
decisions regarding an individual's body are more likely to receive
constitutional protection when they are the product of deliberation
and rational choice. The right to terminate a pregnancy and refuse
medical treatment underscores this notion. The Court's ruling in
Glucksberg against physician assisted suicide was based, in part, on
the view that an individual's end-of-life decisions could be the subject
of irrationality, mental illness, or coercion. 151
The fifth theme is specificity. When seeking to interfere with an
individual's decision regarding the quality and duration of his life, the
state must, or at the very least should, have a specific reason justifying
the intrusion. This is true because the rights the state seeks to regulate are fundamental and "implicit in the concept of ordered liberty."1 52 Ultimately, therefore, the Court's opinions support an
individual's right to make decisions regarding her body, which includes the termination of both life and potential life. These rights are
only restricted when an individual is incapable of consenting
(Cruzan), incapable of making a rational choice or subject to coercion
(Glucksberg), or when a third party is involved (Roe post-viability).
None of these restrictions can justify prohibiting an individualwhether they are mentally or physically ill or in perfect health-from
committing suicide. As individuals, we own our bodies. That carries
with it certain rights. We have the right to examine the world and
define the relative concepts of meaning and purpose. That can and
will inform how we choose to live our life, whether it is the occupation
we choose or the place where we choose to live. We have the right to
think for ourselves and determine whether there is a God or an afterlife, which will, in turn, affect our values and beliefs. We have the
right to form relationships with other people on a variety of levels and
to experience the many events that contribute to our ethical and
moral constitution. Most importantly, we have the right to determine
the quality of our lives. As adults, we are allowed to refuse unwanted
medical care that is detrimental to our physical health. We can refuse
150. Casey, 505 U.S. at 847.
151. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. at 732.
152. Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 152 (1973) (quoting Palko v. Connecticut, 302 U.S.
319, 325 (1937)).
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medication to successfully treat mental illnesses. We can make a variety of choices that can affect the health of our bodies and our susceptibility to disease. We can make these choices because we own our
bodies. These principles reflect those that lie at the core of the
Court's substantive due process jurisprudence: "At the heart of liberty
is the right to define one's own concept of existence, of meaning, of
the universe, and of the mystery of human life."'
It could be argued that people who contemplate suicide are inherently incapable of exercising rational judgment because they suffer
from a mental illness. However, this argument is problematic for multiple reasons. First, it is highly presumptuous to assume that all individuals who decide to commit suicide are mentally ill. Second, it
should not matter, because those who suffer from mental illness may
at some point decide their quality of life is such that they no longer
wish to live. They own their bodies and are entitled to make this
choice.
Crucially, however, the unconditional right to suicide is not simply
based upon legal principles. As set forth below, an individual's right
to end his life is predicated upon a conception of rights and a definition of values that is subjective rather than objective. The theoretical
basis for suicide redefines and repositions these terms by arguing that
they have no inherent meaning unless and until each individual, as a
separate entity, gives them meaning. That meaning, however, has no
objective validity; it is merely an expression of the individual's subjective perception of life. It is within this framework that one recognizes
the right to suicide necessarily belongs to the individual and, unless an
individual is not competent to exercise this right, it cannot be taken
away by the state under any circumstances. Using this formulation,
suicide should not only be permitted, but should also be seen as an
essential expression of freedom in its purest form.
III. SUICIDE-THE THEORETICAL FOUNDATION
The unconditional right to commit suicide implicates the question
of how we define individual "rights," as well as the "value" of life.
These concepts have neither an objective nor fixed meaning. To the
degree these concepts are portrayed as having a settled definition or
as inherently prohibiting certain acts, this is so only because of prevailing political and social forces. The question of rights, where they
come from, what they mean, and how they can be exercised, goes beyond the traditional sources from which we divine their existence.
Furthermore, the concept that life is objectively valuable for all individuals in all circumstances imposes upon people a condition that
prevents them from living their lives freely, in accordance with their
values and beliefs. In other words, our method of defining the value
153. Casey, 505 U.S. at 851.
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of life in abstract terms-saying a state has a general interest in protecting and preserving life-actually demeans the value of life itself.
A.

Individual "Rights"

The concept of rights implicates a variety of issues. First, how do
we define a right? Where do rights come from? Are human beings
entitled to rights? Even if an individual has a certain right, how and
under what circumstances may that individual exercise this right? In
what actions may an individual engage as a logical result of possessing
a certain right? Can there ever be a limitation on the exercise of this
right? Can human beings force an individual to forfeit a right, and if
so, can that right be restored to the individual?
1. How is a Right Defined?
A right is not necessarily capable of a precise or universal meaning.
However, a right is something that belongs to the individual. Importantly, a right, in and of itself, is not self-executing. Rather, this Article defines rights as actions reflecting the absolute and unconditional
freedom inherently afforded to individuals by virtue of their very existence, which allow them to make choices for themselves concerning
any matter relating to their existence. This definition is predicated
upon the notion that human beings have complete ownership over
their lives. Of course, such a definition does not countenance harm to
third parties. As such, a right confers both conditional and unconditional status to an individual. The exercise of the right is absolute
unless and until it compromises the absolute exercise of the right of
another individual.
2. Where Do Rights Come From?
A right may come from a variety of sources. First, humans can create or confer a right through legislative or judicial action. However,
this is the weakest source of rights because they are not automatically
granted to the individual by virtue of one's existence. A written document, such as the Constitution, can also confer a right, but this is similar to rights granted through legislative or judicial decree.
Rights originate from more fundamental sources. As human beings, our existence, at its most basic level, has certain attributes. We
are intelligent beings, capable of making rational choices. We have
dominion over our physical and mental constitution. We have the ability to perceive and define the nature of our reality. In other words,
rights originate from the very essence of our existence. We have the
right to exercise all of the faculties and attributes that constitute a
human being, both in the physical and cognitive realm. In this way,
rights come from nature and provide human beings with two things:
(1) absolute freedom; and (2) absolute ownership over their destiny.
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These liberties are unconditional and can neither be interfered with
nor infringed upon, provided that they do not impinge upon a third
party's exercise of these same rights.
The implication, as natural rights philosopher John Locke came to
admit, is that "human beings do indeed possess a right to take their
own lives."' 54 Based upon the definition of rights provided above,
coupled with the source from which they originate, such a conclusion
is unavoidable. To begin with, as John Locke believed, a "natural
right is a right of every man to everything."' 55 In essence, for Locke,
"the foundation or ground of rights, is . . . self-ownership."1 56
Importantly, according to Locke, you cannot have self-ownership
until you discover the self, which for him was "self-consciousness."'
Indeed, self-consciousness was "the basis for unity of experience, intention and action of the person.""' "The self in its very nature is
posited as self-owning ... [and] possessor of its own data of consciousness (my feelings, my idea, my experiences), always found in these
experiences (that which makes them mine) . . . ."159 Locke further

explains that the "self" is the "mysterious compound of the '1' and the
'me,' the abstract and empty ego and the contents of consciousness
understood as mine, and thus me."16 0
Furthermore, "[h]uman beings are unique in that as selves they can
seize on their entire lives as wholes, seeing them as unities, or potential unities spread over the dimensions of time and aiming toward happiness or misery as such." 6 ' In such a way, "[t]he self can give or
attempt to give some shape to this life as a whole . .. life has 'meaning'
for a human person in a way it has not for any other mortal being."162
As one scholar explains:
The self not only possesses its data of consciousness, but also its
body, which is the source of most of these data of consciousness.
The self appropriates the body and makes it its own-that is to say,
makes it the instrument of its intentional actions in relation to its
broader purposes in life. Action becomes in the full sense intentional, and the body, itself inseparable from the happiness and the
misery of the "I" and thoroughly involved with intentionality, becomes the self's own.163
154.
J.L. &
155.
156.
157.
158.
159.
160.
161.
162.
163.

Michael P. Zuckert, Do Natural Rights Derive From Natural Law?, 20
PuB. POL'Y 695, 725 (1997).
Id. at 723.
Id. at 727.
Id. at 728.
Id.
Id. at 728-29.
Id. at 729.
Id.
Id.
Id.
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Thus, "[s]elf-ownership procures ownership of body and action."16 4
The "possession by the self of itself is an exclusive claim in the nature
of a property right."1 65 Consequently, my "self, my happiness and
misery, my body and its action are all mine in such a way that my
sovereignty over them necessarily and ipso facto excludes similar
claims to them by others." 16 6 Morally speaking, therefore, the individual has claims over his "body, actions and road to happiness" because
it is the "possessor of [the] rights to life, liberty, and pursuit of
happiness. "167
3. Are Human Beings Inherently Entitled to Rights?
As a result, human beings are inherently entitled to rights. It can be
argued, however, that some human beings' rights may be restricted.
At the very least, some may argue humans are entitled only to the
most basic rights-which do not include many of the far reaching
rights the Supreme Court identified in its substantive due process jurisprudence or those advocated in this Article. Instead, rights are created only when they are given to humans by those who are in power
and thus authorized to create them. Under this view, rights are the
subject of a political system.
This argument has no merit for a variety of reasons. First, it demeans the value of human existence. To say that rights are dependent
upon the decisions of other humans is to demean the very concept of a
right itself. It also devalues human beings at the expense of others
because it creates a power imbalance between those who create rights
and those who do not. Thus, to the extent that humans are engaged in
the rights-creating enterprise, it should be only in the area of regulating or limiting a right. More specifically, regulating or limiting should
occur only where the exercise of a right has the potential to interfere
or infringe upon the exercise of another person's right, i.e., cause
mental, physical, or emotional suffering to a third party.
Every human being is entitled to various rights by virtue of being
human, including the right to make independent choices regarding the
body, mind, and spirit. When other human beings attempt to interfere
with the rights of another, they are inherently devaluing life itself and
acting contrary to the nature of our existence.
4.

Under What Circumstances May an Individual
Exercise a Right?

An individual's possession of and entitlement to a right does not
necessarily mean the individual may exercise that right under all, or
164.
165.
166.
167.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
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any, circumstances. A right is designed to empower the individual.
The exercise of a right implies that individuals are entitled to be free
entities. Integral to that freedom is the need for control over the individual's physical and mental constitution. However, there is room for
restraint and restriction when the exercise of these rights affects third
parties. An individual cannot unconditionally exercise all rights because that would ultimately undermine the principle of rights itself
and create inequality among those whose rights can and cannot be
most effectively utilized.
5. What Actions May an Individual Engage In as a Logical
Extension of a Particular Right?
In the abstract, the possession of a right means nothing unless the
individual is entitled to engage in actions that are a logical outgrowth
of that right. For example, an individual has the fundamental right to
own his body. It follows that the individual has control over matters
such as how that life is lived and when that life ends. Without these
latter actions, then the right itself ceases to exist.
Some might argue that while humans should not be engaged in the
granting or creating of rights themselves, they should be permitted to
regulate precisely those actions that constitute the logical outgrowth
of the right. However, this argument is problematic because its effect
is to eviscerate the right. Without the logical outgrowth, the right itself is negatively affected. In addition, the argument removes control
of the right from the individual and places it in the hands of others,
who already have the same rights as the individual, thus creating a
situation where one individual has "super-rights" (individual rights
plus control over the exercise of others' rights), while the other has
restricted rights.
6. Can There Ever Be A Limitation on the Exercise of a Right?
Rights can be both absolute and non-absolute. The exercise of a
right is absolute when it is made (1) by the individual; (2) with the
individual's consent; (3) without undue interference from third parties; (4) with a sound mind and mental state; and (5) in a way that
does not interfere with the actions of or cause injury to third parties.
Most importantly, the state has an interest in ensuring that the individual's exercise of a right is the product of free will and rational
choice.
7. Can Human Beings Force an Individual to Forfeit a Right?
A right can be forfeited when an individual materially harms another person's rights. Forfeiture depends on the severity of the harm
inflicted. Physical, financial, and emotional harm are all categories
within which forfeiture of the right may be effectuated. With respect
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to restoration of the right, it should again be based upon the severity
of the injury caused.
B.

The "Value" of Life

The idea that other individuals or institutions have the right to impose a generalized, or even particularized, definition of value on another's life, and thus prohibit them from exercising the right to end
their life, is to demean the value of life itself. Put differently, the word
"value," when considered in the context of a human life, is not capable of objective meaning. Rather, the value of life is defined and determined by the individual who lives that life. Some individuals value
life more than others. Some will find that life is meaningless. Others
will find that life is full of opportunity and purpose. The value of life
for the latter type of individual is different. He or she has the right to
define value this way and act, under the conditions set forth above,
according to this belief. Thus, if an individual desires to commit suicide because he does not find any value in life, he has a right to make
this choice.
Consequently, if we are to promote a universal definition that all
life is valuable in order to restrict individuals from exercising rights
relating to their physical and emotional well being, then for those individuals life often loses its value because they cannot make life-altering
decisions in accordance with their own valuations of life itself. The
power is then shifted to the State, which then regulates whether the
individual may make end-of-life decisions. Nothing could be more
anathema to personal freedom. Individuals have a right to end their
lives, regardless of whether they suffer from a physical illness, mental
illness, or are in perfect health.
1. Physical Ailments
It is largely undisputed that terminally-ill patients may refuse endof-life medical care, thereby hastening their death. These individuals
often experience excruciating pain. There is little, if anything, the
medical profession can do to alleviate their condition, except to ease
their pain. The prognosis does not concern whether they will recover
from their illness but at which point they are likely to die. The circumstances are horrible and, aside from the physical pain, the emotional
anguish about death and the departure from family members and
loved ones is certain to be overwhelmingly traumatic. The termination of life-sustaining medical care is a way for individuals to end their
anguish and die peacefully with loved ones at their side.
However, there are many individuals without terminal medical illnesses who suffer from the same anguish, both physically and mentally. An individual may suffer from a debilitating medical condition,
which restricts his movement. An individual's sensory systems may be
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somewhat, if not entirely, compromised. An individual may have lost
the ability to move certain, if not all, parts of his body. Another person may have suffered severe cognitive injuries that could make it impossible to engage in the type of activities that were commonplace
prior to an injury. An individual may have lost certain parts of his
body due to an accident. There are many physical ailments that may
debilitate an individual and cause physical, mental, and emotional
suffering.
Many individuals with these ailments will lead productive, meaningful, and fulfilling lives. Many will become leaders in the community.
Many will realize their dreams and passions. However, some individuals will not be able to accept this condition, and will suffer daily from
the fact they cannot engage in the type of daily functions and activities
to which they were formerly accustomed. The emotional suffering
they may feel can be horribly painful, and for those individuals, the
very act of living can be a traumatic and unwelcome experience. For
these people, ending their lives can become an option as a way to
alleviate the physical and emotional hardships from which they suffer.
While one would hope that a person would choose to live, it is not
our right to impose our views on them. Our conception of the value
of life is not a substitute for the value that a person places on his life.
It is not for us to determine when a person's illness is severe enough
such that the ending of a life, i.e., refusal of medical treatment, is appropriate. That choice belongs entirely to the individual because it is
their body. While this may be a sad and very difficult reality, it would
be more difficult to ignore the physical and emotional suffering that
these individuals are experiencing and force them to endure a life that
resembles nothing even remotely similar to what they had envisioned.
If we respect liberty and freedom, then we respect the individual
choice to commit suicide, provided it is made rationally and free from
coercion, abuse, or undue influence or pressure.
2.

Mental Illness

Mental illness often affects individuals for the duration of their life.
It can be a powerful force that affects every aspect of daily life.
Whether it is depression, bi-polar disorder, schizophrenia, or others,
mental illness affects an individual's ability to function, whether it is in
a relationship, an occupation, or performing simple tasks affecting
quality of life. Interacting with people is very difficult. It often leads
to isolation. Mental illness can be physically painful and impedes a
person's ability to achieve happiness and the goals he or she seeks to
achieve in his or her life. Also, many people who suffer from mental
illness are placed on medication, which sometimes works and sometimes does not, often coming with debilitating side effects. In other
words, their existence can be more difficult, painful, and challenging.
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In fact, people who suffer from mental illnesses die, on average,
twenty-five years earlier than the general population.1 68
Of course, many people do recover from mental illnesses and subsequently lead happy and fulfilling lives. Unfortunately, for some people, untreated mental anguish affects every aspect of their lives. The
struggle to be happy, to lead a normal life, and to find fulfilling relationships may become overwhelming and the person may no longer
wish to continue living. 6 9 Individuals with mental illnesses-who can
otherwise demonstrate that the choice to end their lives is the product
of sound, rational, and informed judgment-have the right to die.
This brings up an important point. Some may object on the grounds
that those who suffer from mental illnesses are inherently incapable of
making rational decisions. However, aside from the fact that this represents an unwarranted prejudice against the mentally ill, it contradicts the relevant empirical evidence. Specifically, with respect to
cognitive ability, "[t]he competency level of psychiatric patients has
been demonstrated to be statistically indistinguishable from the competency level of normal medical patients." 70 Furthermore, "[a]cross
the board, mentally ill patients demonstrated a similar ability to both
comprehend information required to obtain informed consent and
make rational choices regarding their medical treatment.""' In fact,
"even those patients exhibiting the most chronic levels of mental illness were able to . . . make rational decisions."' 7 2

Of course, this does not mean that every mentally ill patient will
demonstrate the ability to make rational judgments regarding the decision to end their lives. For example, "schizophrenic patients are
more likely to demonstrate lower levels of understanding of treatment
disclosures than are normal medically ill patients."' 7 3 Moreover, one
scholar has argued that many mental illnesses compromise an individual's ability to process information and "engage in planned behavior. "74 Additionally, "there is ample evidence to support the
168. Marilyn Elias, Mentally Ill Die 25 Years Earlier, on Average, USA TODAY
(May 3, 2007, 7:49 AM), http://www.usatoday.com/news/health/2007-05-03-mentalillness N.htm.
169. See Joanmarie Ilaria Davoli, No Room at the Inn: How the Federal Medicaid
ProgramCreated Inequities in PsychiatricHospitalAccess for the Indigent Mentally Ill,
29 AM. J.L. & MED. 159, 175-76 (2003) ("Having an untreated mental illness can
shorten one's life expectancy. In fact, the untreated mentally ill account for a large
number of deaths by suicide. 'Suicide rates in schizophrenia are almost as high as
they are in depression, where they are estimated to run between 10% and 15%.'")
(quoting RAEL JEAN ISAAC & VIRGINIA C. ARMAT, MADNESS IN THE STREETS 281
(1990)).
170. Maurice S. Fisher, Jr., Comment, PsychiatricAdvance Directives and the Right

To Be Presumed Competent, 25 J. CONTEMP. HEALTH L. & POL'Y 386, 403 (2009).
171. Id.
172. Id.
173. Id. at 404.
174. Steven K. Erickson, The Myth of Mental Disorder: Transsubstantive Behavior
and Taxometric Psychiatry, 41 AKRON L. REv. 67, 83 (2008).
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proposition that a mentally ill patient's level of competency to consent
to treatment shifts as his or her condition improves through
treatment." 7 5
Ultimately, therefore, in those cases where individuals with mental
illnesses express a desire to end their lives, we must proceed with caution. Many mentally ill patients can and do have the ability to exercise rational judgment. However, because this function can, in some
cases, be compromised, it is incumbent to discuss with the individual
(1) the specific mental illness that is present; (2) its severity; and (3)
the amount of time since the illness was diagnosed. Using these and
other factors as deemed necessary by relevant medical professionals,
there can be an informed decision concerning the individual's capability for rational judgment.
3. People in Perfect Health
Individuals in perfect health have an unconditional right to commit
suicide. People value life differently. For some, the world has no
meaning. It is comprised of "nothingness." Everything we do, every
goal we achieve, every award we obtain, ultimately has no purpose.
For these people, life is artificial and everything we do to provide
meaning simply hides the fact that the world has none. As a result,
they may view their life as a futile enterprise. Thus, people in perfect
physical and mental health may desire to end their lives because they
cannot accept the feelings or emotions that accompany this
worldview. These people do not need therapy. They do not suffer
from a mental illness or abnormality. They are rational individuals
who can make the rational choice to end their lives. Other humans
are in no position to infringe upon this right because humans are free
beings and exercising a right that is inherent to human existence itself,
namely ownership and control over the body and its destiny.
That is precisely why suicide constitutes a right that any individual
may exercise under all but the narrowest of circumstances. First, committing suicide is an act by the individual, an expression of freedom in
its purest sense that neither infringes upon nor interferes with the exercise of another's rights. 176
Second, the act of committing suicide is a logical outgrowth of the
rights that are inherent in human existence itself. As humans, we are
intelligent beings capable of taking actions based upon mental and
cognitive processes. The physical body is the manner by which we
manifest the choices we have made. In other words, we have control
175. Fisher, supra note 170, at 404.
176. Of course, committing suicide can have many tangible consequences, such as
emotional trauma to friends and family members and increased financial obligations.
This, however, misses the point. The issue is whether the individual's act of suicide
infringes, directly or indirectly, upon a third parties' right to absolute ownership and
freedom regarding their "natural" rights, i.e., the same right to end their lives.
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over our mind and body. This logically includes the right to commit
suicide, just as it includes the right to an abortion and to refuse unwanted, end-of-life medical care. Stated simply, without the right to
take actions with our physical body, we do not have ownership over
our destiny. Importantly, the only circumstances within which an individual may not exercise the right to commit suicide is when the decision is not the product of rational thought, is without the person's
informed consent, or is the subject of abuse or coercion. Otherwise,
committing suicide is a near-absolute right. As set forth below, an
organization should facilitate this right, providing for the peaceful and
painless termination of life.
IV. SUICIDE--MAKING IT PEACEFUL AND POSSIBLE
Some may react harshly to the notion that there should be an organization dedicated to providing individuals with a peaceful way to
end their lives. However, there already exists an institution doing
such work, called Dignitas, located in Switzerland. The purpose of
Dignitas is to help mostly terminally-ill individuals peacefully end
their lives, while ensuring this is their actual desire and not an irrational decision. Rather, this decision must be the product of a conscious and deliberative choice. While Dignitas does not advocate for
suicide under all of the circumstances suggested in this Article, namely
for a person in good health, it does provide procedures similar to
those which would ensure that an individual's choice was the product
of free and unbridled will.
A.

Dignitas

Dignitas was founded on May 17, 1998 and "has helped a total of
1060 people to end their lives gently, safely, without risk and usually
in the presence of family members and/or friends."177 However, during its existence, Dignitas "has also helped several thousand people
continue to live despite their difficult health conditions. "178 While
these people initially desired to commit suicide, "it was possible to
show them-usually with the assistance of doctors-an alternative to
prematurely ending their life.""' Importantly, Dignitas "has not limited itself to offering this help only to people who reside in Switzerland," as "a person's wish to end his or her life is a human right
recognised by the Federal Supreme Court of Switzerland and protected by Article 8 of the European Human Rights Convention
"180

177. DIGNITAS, How DIGNITAS WORKS: ON WHAT PHILOSOPHICAL PRINCIPLES ARE THE ACTIVITIES OF THIS ORGANISATION BASED? 2 (2010), available at http:/

/www.dignitas.chlimages/stories/pdf/so-funktioniert-dignitas-e.pdf.
178. Id.
179. Id.
180. Id.
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When an individual contacts Dignitas and expresses a desire to commit suicide, that individual is subject to a lengthy process before his
wish is honored. The first step for individuals seeking assisted suicide
is to complete an application for membership."'1 When the application is received, membership is awarded.' 8 2 Prior to membership, a
person may make a request for the preparation of an assisted suicide.183 The person must state the "health matters" that are significantly affecting the quality of his life and provide medical
documentation.' 8 4 The applicant is also required to provide details
about his life, including information about his "character as well as
[his] family and work situations."' 8 5 Importantly, if Dignitas becomes
aware of a doctor in that person's "immediate" vicinity that can offer
help-particularly in cases of physical pain-they are referred to such
doctor before any additional action is taken.' 8 6
When the application is received, Dignitas reviews it and gives
"consideration to the question of whether the applicant can be given
any immediate recommendations for possible alternatives with the
hope of being able to continue life under better conditions."' Alternatives include therapy and palliative care.18 8 However, because of
the severity of a patient's medical condition, these options may not be
available in some cases.
After Dignitas considers alternatives and examines all of the relevant information, a doctor evaluates the documentation and then either approves or rejects the administration of a lethal prescription for
the patient.18 9 Sometimes, the doctor will give a temporary refusal
contingent upon the receipt of further information or simply give a
"provision green light" to prescribe the lethal medication.' 90 However, before the provision green light is given, the doctor must meet
with the patient twice to be sure there are no signs of "impaired or
doubtful mental capacity . .. signs of pressure from a third party with

regard to a premature death, or evidence of an acute depressive
phase." 191
Dignitas also informs the patient that family members are allowed
to be present when the assisted suicide is consummated.192 After this,
the assisted suicide is scheduled.' 93 At this point, however, Dignitas
181.
182.
183.
184.
185.
186.
187.
188.
189.
190.
191.
192.
193.

See id. at 3.
Id. at 6.
Id.
Id.
Id.
See id. at 5.
Id. at 8.
Id. at 9.
Id. at 10.
Id. at 11.
Id.
Id. at 12.
Id. at 13.
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does not proceed to the next step or initiate any further proceeding
until the patient expresses the desire to continue with the process.194
Should the patient indicate a desire to move forward, Dignitas then
ensures that all medical records are up-to-date and civil documents
are present.195 Then the member must have two more consultations
with the doctor, which is "necessary so that the question of writing the
prescription can finally and definitively be decided upon."196
After these and other procedures are completed, the rules governing the suicide itself are implemented. First, "two members of the
assistance team are always assigned" to assist in granting the patient's
wishes.197 Then, the patient and family members are greeted at
Dignitas, and another meeting is held with the patient, in order to
ensure that he still wishes to proceed.198 In this meeting, the medical
process is explained to the patient, and if there are any lingering
doubts, the procedure is cancelled.' 9 9 If the patient is of sound mind
and wishes to proceed, a final document is prepared giving Dignitas
authority to complete the assisted suicide.2 00 After this is completed,
the patient may say good-bye to his family members before the medication is administered, and they may be present in the room as the
process is completed.
B.

Suicide in the United States

Everyone has the right to commit suicide. The right, however, is
not absolute. There are two instances where suicide should be prevented. First, people that are not competent to make that choice, i.e.,
those that are cognitively impaired, can never make such a decision.
Second, those who claim they want to commit suicide-but actually
do not-must be identified and prevented from completing the act.
Of course, there will always be individuals that commit suicide in the
privacy of their own home or in a way where the possibility of intervention is remote. Advocating for a right to suicide is highly unlikely
to change this fact, nor is it likely to result in more people committing
suicide because there is no evidence whatsoever that illegality acts as a
deterrent for people who wish to end their lives.
For people who want to end their lives, however, there should be
safeguards in place to ensure the administration of lethal medication
that will result in a peaceful, painless, and dignified death.
194.
195.
196.
197.
198.
199.
200.

Id.
Id. at 14.
Id.
Id. at 17.
See id. at 18-19.
Id. at 19.
Id. at 20.
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1. An Organization for the Administration of Assistance with
End-of-Life Decisions
There should be an organization similar to Dignitas that assists people who desire to end their lives. The object of such an organization
would be to ensure that the individual's wishes are based upon a deliberative and contemplative choice; free from coercion, undue pressure, and influence; the product of rational thought; and made with
the knowledge of available alternatives that might assist the individual
in whatever capacity he or she may need.
Even though every individual has the right to commit suicide, the
organization should require a statement of reasons underlying the desire to commit suicide. This statement should include information
about, among other things, the individual's background, childhood,
education, occupation(s), medical history, current and former relationships, existence of family members, current residence, and any
prior attempts, if any, to mitigate the individual's desire to commit
suicide.
There should be an intake interview. The individual should have
the opportunity to provide informed consent. Put differently, the individual should be provided with any and all alternatives to suicide
that may assist in changing his mental state, alleviating a medical condition, or reframing a particular disposition toward life and happiness.
After the individual is provided with this information, he must sign a
contract stating that he has been provided with such information and
still wishes to proceed. At that point, there should be a waiting period
before the suicide is consummated.
2. Consultation with a Medical Doctor
The individual should be required to see a physician before the request is honored. The physician would be required to conduct a thorough physical examination of the patient, including any relevant tests
and procedures, to ensure that the patient is capable of making a rational choice to end his life. Any conditions that may have the potential to interfere with the individual's ability to make an informed
judgment should result in a refusal to carry out the individual's
request.
3. Consultation with a Psychiatrist
A consultation with a psychiatrist is necessary to ensure that the
individual is not suffering from a medical condition that would impair
his ability to reason and make informed judgments. For example,
traumatic brain injuries may make it difficult for the individual to
make a rational choice to commit suicide. Importantly, however, a
diagnosis of a mental illness alone is not sufficient to prevent an individual from committing suicide. The only grounds for recommending
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that the suicide be rejected is if the individual's cognitive capacities
are impaired due to a mental abnormality or defect, or if the individual exhibits signs that he is unable to control his behavior.
4. Consultation with a Psychologist
Consultation with a psychologist is necessary because an individual's desire to commit suicide may be temporary. Such a desire may
be the result of recent yet significant emotional traumas such as the
death of a family member, the loss of a job, or break-up of a marriage.
A psychotherapist is best positioned to assess whether the suicidal
thoughts are the product of these traumas and thus best dealt with
through measures other than suicide. Should the therapist determine
that the suicidal desires are in fact the result of underlying emotional
or physical traumas, then in no circumstance can suicide be an option.
5. Consultation with Friends and Family Members
If the individual has friends and family, he should be strongly encouraged to consult with them prior to making a decision of such finality. Often, people do not realize the type of support that exists
until they reach out to others who sincerely care for them and would
help them through difficult periods in their lives. Of course, the individual need not consult with anyone. The right to suicide belongs to
the individual alone.
6. Consultation with Others Similarly Situated
The individual should be required to participate in multiple group
therapy sessions in which participants discuss their individual decisions to end their lives, as well as the underlying reasons that motivated them to make such a decision. These discussions may be
therapeutic to some or any of the individuals and may therefore deter
them from completing their request to die.
7. Treatment for Physical Ailments
If the individual's suicide request is predicated upon a curable physical ailment, then any and all attempts should be made to persuade the
individual that alternative treatments are available to remedy this ailment and allow the individual to lead a normal, fully functioning life.
However, the individual has the right to reject this advice and proceed
accordingly.
V. CONCLUSION
The idea that people should be allowed to commit suicide is very
difficult to accept. It is also difficult to allow extremely unpopular,
and sometimes racist, sexist, or homophobic groups to march or have
demonstrations in support of their views. We may despise those who
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burn the American flag or who denigrate those who serve in the
armed forces. Yet, we allow this activity, however unpopular, because
we believe in the freedom and autonomy of the individual. The concept of freedom lies at the core of human existence because it allows
us to exercise ownership over our physical and mental capacities and
to express ourselves in whatever form we deem meaningful. The most
fundamental aspect of that ownership, and of freedom itself, is the
right to control how we use, direct, and protect our bodies. Our life
belongs to us, and that includes the right to determine the quality of
how we live and the time when we decide to die. If we deny this right,
we deny something more fundamental-the right to own our existence. We are the authors of our own lives-and nobody can take that
away.
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